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This article addresses the question of how the increasing revival of interest in
citizenship as a basis for rights in constitutional thought will affect aliens-people
who lack citizenship by formal definition. Specifically, the article considers the
question whether aliens will necessarily suffer in the wake of the recent citizenship
turn in constitutional law and theory. Although there is a good case to be made that
aliens will be disadvantaged, some constitutional commentary from the 1970's
provocatively suggests that the position of aliens would not necessarily be
undermined if we were to recast our conception of constitutional rights in the
language and structures of citizenship. This article contends that the prospect of
citizenship for aliens, however paradoxical, is not impossible. This is because
citizenship is, in our law and conventional understandings, a divided construct. The
status of citizenship and the rights we associate with citizenship are not always
coextensive. We conventionally talk about "second-class citizens ": these are people
who enjoy status citizenship but who nevertheless are denied the enjoyment of
citizenship rights or "equal citizenship. "Aliens may, conversely, be said to enjoy
certain incidents of "equal citizenship" in our society by virtue of their possession
of an important range offfundamental rights, notwithstanding their lack of status-
citizenship.
But while "alien citizenship" is not an entirely incoherent notion within the terms of
conventional constitutional thought, this article argues that the citizenship that
noncitizens can aspire to remains limited in scope. This is because the
constitutional ideal of equal citizenship is committed not only to universal rights
(thereby including aliens) but also to an ethic of national solidarity and to a
practice of bounded national membership. It is by virtue of these nationalist
commitments that aliens-so long as they remain aliens-can aspire to partial
citizenship at best.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding Alexander Bickel's declaration a generation ago that the
concept of citizenship is of little significance in American constitutional law, ' the idea
of citizenship has enjoyed a huge resurgence of interest in constitutional law
scholarship in recent years. Much of the literature concerned with citizenship today
deploys the concept in the mode of normative political theory, with scholars
embracing the concept as an aspirational ideal for our national political life.
Citizenship is portrayed in this literature as embodying the highest political values:
democracy, egalitarianism, pluralism, civic virtue, community-and sometimes, all of
these at once.
Constitutional theorists' decidedly romantic preoccupation with citizenship in
recent years echoes the work of theorists in neighboring disciplines for whom the
concept of citizenship has likewise become a central normative benchmark.2 Yet the
work of many constitutional scholars goes beyond normative theory per se;
increasingly, many have sought to attach the commitments they ascribe to the idea of
citizenship to constitutional text. In particular, many have urged that the concept of
constitutional citizenship should be read to encompass and ground our most basic
individual rights. There is today a burgeoning movement in constitutional theory to
recast our constitutional rights framework in the language and structures of
citizenship.
In their efforts to reorient constitutional rights discourse around the idea of
citizenship, scholars have pursued a variety of textual strategies. Some invoke the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, urging interpretive
restoration of this long-dormant provision to Fourteenth Amendmentjurisprudence. 3
Others have seized on the Amendment's Citizenship Clause. Despite its usual
1 Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship In the American Constitution, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 369
(1973).
2 As one commentator has recently noted, the "ideal of citizenship has become a 'big tent'
under which a wide range of initiatives... can find shelter. Indeed, public and policy intellectuals
have reclaimed it as a legitimating sign under which to pursue new, diverse, and conflicting
projects of political transformation and cultural renewal." David Scobey, The Specter of
Citizenship, 5 CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 11, 21 (2001). For additional reviews of the broad-ranging
literature on citizenship in political and social thought, see Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman,
Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHics 352 (1994);
Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000).
3 The Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), dramatically
intensified the interest in the Privileges or Immunities Clause and has fueled a debate over the
question whether the Clause is likely to enjoy a full-scale renaissance. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe,
Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future--or Reveal
the Structure ofthe Present?, 113 HARV. L. REv. 110 (1999); F.H. Buckley, LiberalNationalism,
48 UCLA L. REv. 221 (2000); Tim A. Lemper, Note, The Promise and Perils of "Privileges or
Immunities": Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 295 (1999).
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interpretation as a definitional provision, 4 these commentators argue that the clause
should be understood to guarantee basic substantive rights as well.5 Still others have
located the idea of constitutional citizenship in the Equal Protection Clause. In this
reading, the clause' s core animating principle is the principle of "equal citizenship."6
The citizenship turn in constitutional theory has important merits. Among other
things, reincorporating Fourteenth Amendment citizenship into our rights discourse
might, as some scholars have argued, provide the foundation for a more coherent
rights jurisprudence. Those seeking a revival of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
in particular regard the effective disabling of the clause both in The Slaughter-House
Cases7 and the subsequent development of individual rights jurisprudence under the
aegis of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as having produced deep
irrationalities in the doctrine.8 It might well be true that the revitalization of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause would help to rationalize--and perhaps even to
deepen-the various doctrines of substantive, fundamental rights.9
4 This is the classic reading. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,94
(1872) (Field, J., dissenting) ("The first clause of this [the Fourteenth]Amendment determines who
are citizens of the United States, and how their citizenship is created."); T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Re-reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship,
1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 961,964 (1992) ("[The Fourteenth Amendment] provided, for the first time, a
constitutional definition of citizenship .... ).
5 See CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., SiRucTUR AND RELATioNsHIP IN CONSTMTrONAL LAW 33-66
(1969). For additional citations to a fast-growing body of scholarship advancing such an
"aggressive reading" of the clause, see Christopher Eisgruber, Political Unity and the Powers of
Government, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1297, 1328 n.117 (1994).
6 Against the suggestion that the Equal Protection Clause is not the appropriate textual home
for the principle of equal citizenship, Kenneth Karst argued in 1977 that the Equal Protection
Clause "shows every sign of being able to bear the full meaning of the equal citizenship principle."
Kenneth L. Karst, Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 43 (1977).
7 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 36. As one commentator described the
case, the Court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment "protected only what was already otherwise protected in the Constitution." Lino A.
Graglia, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?-The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 83 (1989).
8 See sources cited infra note 55.
9 Some progressives have suggested that a revival of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
could serve the interests of the marginalized and excluded. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Beyond
Equality: Power and the Possibility of Freedom in the Republic of Choice, 85 CORNELL L. REv.
1181, 1183 (2000) ("[T]he Privileges or Immunities Clause was about freedom: specifically, the
freedom of six million or so people of African descent .... [It was] an exercise in considering the
relevance of [the already-existing literature on natural rights] to the project of emancipation.").
Harris describes this project in lamenting terms as the "road not taken." Id. at 1184.
Note, however, that proponents of a revitalization of the Privileges or Immunities Clause have
included supporters of limited government, judicial restraint, and laissez-faire constitutionalism.
See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
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It is also true that the idea of "citizenship" as an organizing value possesses
substantial normative resonance and power.'0 The concept of citizenship is
particularly valuable in its evocation of a mutual and engaged relationship between
the political community and its members. This is a relationship that some traditional
rights theory has, arguably, sometimes obscured or ignored to its detriment.
Despite its potential benefits, however, this turn to the idea of citizenship as
foundation for constitutional rights is not without its costs. I Perhaps the principal one
has to do with its effects on the status of aliens. If rights are defined as an attribute of
citizenship, what then of those who lack citizenship by legal definition? Those
formally lacking in citizenship would seem to fall, at least arguably, outside the scope
of this normative discourse. Bickel himself warned thirty years ago that aliens would
suffer under a citizenship-centered constitutional regime, ' 2 and this concern remains
pressing today. Notwithstanding the common criticism that the idea of rights
grounded in the status of personhood is excessively "thin,' 31 believe that we can be
justifiably proud of a constitutional system that treats non-citizens as entitled to a
substantial measure of community recognition and protection. 14 Whether such
recognition and protection would withstand adoption of a rights regime organized
around the idea of constitutional citizenship remains an open question.
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63 (1989); see also Phillip Kurland,
The Privileges ormmunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last"?, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405,
414 (1972) (describing support of "privileges or immunities as a means to establish a constitutional
doctrine of laissez-faire with regard to industrial and commenrcial activities").
1°Bosniak, supra note 2, at 450-53, 489-91; Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, Civil
Citizenship Against Social Citizenship? On the Ideology of Contract-versus-Charity, in THE
CONDMON OF CrzENsHIP 90,90 (Bart Van Steenbergen ed., 1994) (describing citizenship as "a
weighty, monumental, humanist word" that has "no pejorative uses").
I I One of these, as I have suggested above, is that the concept is so utterly flexible and
protean in meaning that its usefulness in analytic discussion is sometimes compromised. I have
addressed the multiple meanings of citizenship in an earlier paper. See Bosniak, supra note 2.
12 Bickel, supra note 1.
13 Kylmlicka & Norman, supra note 2, at 354.
14 For discussion of the development and significance of the American jurisprudence of
personhood and its impact on noncitizens, see, for example, Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and
Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988
Wis. L. REv. 955 [hereinafter Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership]; Linda S. Bosniak,
Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047 (1994)
[hereinafter Bosniak, Difference ThatAlienage Makes]; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 4; Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms
and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). The Supreme Court forcefully reiterated
its longstanding position that aliens enjoy fundamental rights as territorially-present persons in the
recent decision Zadvydas v. Davis, in which Justice Breyer wrote for the majority that "the Due
Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
693 (2001).
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the principle of "equal citizenship."68 For Karst, citizenship status is a "simple
idea," 69 a "constitutional trifle,"70 whereas the broader conception of equal
citizenship entails "the dignity of full membership in the society," 71 and constitutes,
for this reason, the fundamental normative value of our national life.72
There are good reasons for approaching citizenship in this hierarchical fashion.
Doing so represents a response to the history of discrimination in this country and
elsewhere, pursuant to which the formal citizenship status of subordinated groups has
been recognized while these groups have, at the same time, remained excluded and
marginalized in many significant respects. Scholars' normative prioritization of rights
citizenship over status citizenship can be read, in other words, as part of a critique of
legal arrangements whereby individuals possess formal citizenship status but
experience de facto exclusion and powerlessness. Such a critique is often articulated
as the critique of "second-class citizenship."
"Second-class citizenship" is a concept that has been normatively powerful in
American political and legal discourse. In rhetorical terms, it has been quite effective
in conveying the idea that the extension of the formal status of citizenship, alone, can
mask real oppression and thereby represents a largely empty husk.73 Much of the
history of citizenship in this country can be, and has been, recounted in these terms.74
After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, African-Americans possessed
formal citizenship but remained subordinated in virtually every sphere. Likewise, for
many years women were recognized as possessing the nominal status of citizenship,
and yet they were denied the franchise and other fundamental incidents of
68 Karst describes the principle of equal citizenship not merely as a constitutional mandate but
as "an ideal, a cluster of value premises." Karst, supra note 6, at 5.
69 Id. at 5 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 54 (1975)).
70 Id.; see also KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONsTmrruON 10 (1989) ("1 agree that the bare legal status of citizenship is a constitutional
trifle .... ).
71 Karst, supra note 6, at 5; see also KARST, supra note 70, at 10 ("[Real membership in the
community is more than a legal status....").
72 For other articulations of this antimony, see, for example, BLACK, supra note 5, at 53
(arguing that the Citizenship Clause does not simply bestow an "honorific label" but it also
mandates, more substantively, "incorporation and participation in society"); Note, supra note 27, at
1946 ("Although the title of 'citizen' has been reduced to a mere legal status, the belief that
'citizenship means something' remains a powerful emotional and symbolic legacy in our political
traditions.").
73 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Kinoy, supra note
60, at 403.
74 See, e.g., Kenneth Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA.L. REv. 245, 288 (1983) (stating
that formal citizenship never guaranteed full societal membership; "'[actual membership was
determined by additional tests of religion, perhaps, or race or language or behavior, tests that varied
considerably among segments and over time."' (quoting ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEGMENTED
SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEANING OF AMERICA 95 (1975))).
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membership. Sometimes, the denial of rights to citizens was overfly defended. The
citizenship of some groups was simply deemed to be less complete than that of others.
Increasingly, however, rights that we now regard as integral to citizenship were
denied to status citizens through court decisions maintaining that these rights fell
outside the core substantive requirements of citizenship. The classic example is the
decision in the 1875 case of Minor v. Happersett, in which the Supreme Court
concluded that voting was not a "privilege or immunity of citizenship." 75
The critique of second-class citizenship is thus a critique of citizenship
formalism, whereby nominal membership serves to mask the continued exclusion and
social domination of historically marginalized groups. It is a critique of citizenship
minimalism as well; it rejects the notion that the class of citizens can be defined as
pure status holders without being acknowledged and empowered as active community
participants, and it demands recognition and effectuation of rights and protections that
make community membership meaningful. 76
While this is an indispensable form of political and legal criticism, the second-
class citizenship critique also suffers from certain limitations. One problem is that the
focus on the denial of rights to status citizens often renders the critique insensitive to
the history of systematic denial of citizenship status itself to members of subordinated
groups in this country. Important recent scholarship on Asian and other non-white
exclusion from naturalization eligibility, and on the history of married women's
75 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S (21 Wall.) 162, 171 (1875). Proponents of "economic
citizenship" today would argue that Congress and the courts have wrongfully excluded economic
rights from the scope of substantive citizenship as well.
76 While most invocations of the idea of "second-class citizenship" counterpose the
possession of formal citizenship status with the denial of substantive rights, the term has
sometimes been used to describe the imposition of lesser forms of citizenship status itself. See, e.g.,
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 169 (1964) (holding that a statute which deprived naturalized
citizens of their citizenship status if they resided abroad for three years in their place of original
nationality or birth creates "a second-class citizenship"); see also Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S.
654,658 (1946) ("Citizenship obtained through naturalization is not a second-class citizenship.");
Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
Members of the Supreme Court have often used the concept of "second-class citizenship" in
an offhand and unexamined way to refer to a condition of exclusion, stigma, or less favorable
treatment experienced by a subject group (most often African-Americans and other racial
minorities; sometimes veterans, juveniles or others). In one case, however, there is a brief exchange
among the Justices about the concept: Justice Black, dissenting in Rogers v. Bellei, argues that
"[u]nder the view adopted by the majority today, all children born to Americans while abroad
would be excluded from the protections of the Citizenship Clause and would instead be relegated
to the permanent status of second-class citizenship, subject to revocation at the will of Congress."
401 U.S. at 839 (Black, J., dissenting). The majority, in response, describes this characterization-
that the holding imposes second-class citizenship--as a "cliche [that] is too handy and too easy,
and, like most cliches, can be misleading." Id. at 835. Perhaps in part because second-class
citizenship is an inherently critical term, it is far more often invoked in dissenting than in majority
opinions.
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Nevertheless, these implications for the status of aliens represented by the turn to
citizenship are most often ignored by constitutional scholars. Even among progressive
scholars, who by definition are concerned with the marginalized and excluded, the
subject is rarely on the radar screen. Progressive constitutional scholars have recently
urged the recognition of the citizenship of gays and lesbians 15 and of the
economically marginalized, 16 along with racial minorities, women, and others,
without, in most cases, acknowledging the potential doctrinal and rhetorical costs that
doing so might pose to noncitizens.17
Among those scholars who have addressed the question, the conventional view is
that the grounding of constitutional rights in the idea of citizenship runs the risk of
excluding aliens. Laurence Tribe, for instance, has recently noted that a revival of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause may ultimately result in the denial to aliens of the
constitutional protection they now enjoy under substantive due process: "there may be
no convincing escape," he writes, "from the conclusion that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, while providing a sounder basis than the Due Process Clause for
the protection of substantive rights, protects only a limited group of persons-United
States citizens."18 Similarly, John Ely wrote a generation ago that, in light of the
express terms of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, most commentators see
themselves as "stuck with the conclusion that only citizens are protected."' 9
For some commentators, such an outcome is not particularly troubling. Their
view is that citizenship is a constitutional value too long ignored in this country, and
that once revived, citizenship rights belong, quite naturally and rightfully, to those
who possess citizenship status. For those of us concerned with the condition and well-
being of noncitizens, however, their exclusion from this potential new domain of
rights is indeed worrisome. Charles Black, for example, noted in the course of
outlining his structural argument for grounding constitutional rights in the Citizenship
Clause that he used the word "citizen" hesitatingly because the "inference of rights
from citizenship" might be regarded as excluding or otherwise disadvantaging
aliens.20 I myself in earlier work have questioned the turn to citizenship as a basis for
15 William N. Eskridge, The Relationship Between Obligations and Rights of Citizens, 69
FORDHAM L. REv. 1721, 1742-49 (2001); see also Mark Strasser, The Privileges of National
Citizenship: On Saenz, Same-Sex Couples, and the Right to Travel, 52 RUTGERs L. REv. 553
(2000) (urging that the Privileges or Immunities Clause be interpreted to protect the right of same-
sex couples to wed).
16 See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1, 7-9
(1999); Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 Cornell L.
Rev. 523 (1997).
17 Linda S. Bosniak, Universal Citizenship and the Problem ofAlienage, 94 Nw. U. L. REv.
963 (2000).
18 LAuRENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSMITrUTONAL LAW § 7-6, at 1325 (3d ed. 2000).
19 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICAL REVIEw 25 (1980).
20 BLACK, supra note 5, at 52-53; see also Kurland, supra note 9, at 415.
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rights for precisely the same reason: I argued that grounding rights in the concept of
citizenship is problematic because doing so would likely redound against those
individuals who lack citizenship status by legal definition.21
The question of whether the exclusion of aliens from the domain of basic rights is
a good or bad thing is, of course, a longstanding one. But that question is not my
concern here, at least not directly. Rather, the focus of the present paper is the basic
factual premise which underlies this dispute in the first instance: namely, that a return
to citizenship as rights necessarily entails an exclusion of, or disadvantage to,
noncitizens. I want to argue here that the premise that citizenship rights must be
confined to status citizens is less secure than we tend to assume.
My initial impetus for the argument derives, in part, from reading constitutional
theory of the 1970s and 1980s on the subjects of citizenship and alienage. While
citizenship was not the fashionable concept it has since become, some scholars at the
time argued that a reorientation of constitutional rights discourse around the concept
of citizenship would serve as an antidote to the peculiarities of the substantive due
process doctrine and, in the view of some, would serve as a response to the chronic
legal marginalization and subordination of African Americans in American life. Thus,
Charles Black, Phillip Bobbit, John Ely, Kenneth Karst, Philip Kurland, and others
each defended a return to citizenship as a basis for rights in constitutional law (though
by way of several different doctrinal routes). In so doing, each of these scholars
recognized the potential cost of doing so to noncitizens. Yet each sought to mitigate
this effect by means of one of two main arguments. First, some argued, restoration of
citizenship does not necessarily entail the elimination of rights grounded in
personhood, but can serve instead to supplement them. 22 This is, effectively, an
argument that constitutional rights doctrine can hereafter proceed on a double track,
with the law of personhood not displaced, but augmented, by the law of citizenship.
Philip Kurland, for example, wrote of the possible revival of the Privileges or
It is possible that for some the [Privileges or Immunities] clause was deemed
inhospitable because by its language it confined its protection to citizens, while the equal
protection clause and the due process clause afford sanctuary for all persons, including
corporations, which the Supreme Court had specifically held to be outside the ambit of the
privileges or immunities clause.
Id
21 See Linda S. Bosniak, The Citizenship ofAliens, SOCIALTEXT, Fall 1998, at 29; Bosniak,
supra note 17. Gerald L. Neuman expressed similar concerns in response to Judith Shklar' s work
on rights and American citizenship. See Gerald L. Neuman, Rhetorical Slavery, Rhetorical
Citizenship, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1276, 1283-90 (1992) (reviewing JuDi N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN
CIIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION (1991)).
22 In his dissent in Saenz, Justice Thomas argues that before reinvoking the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as the basis for constitutional decision, the Court must, among other things,
"consider whether the Clause should displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal
protection and substantive due process jurisprudence." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Immunities Clause: "there the clause is, an empty and unused vessel which affords
the Court full opportunity to determine its contents without even the need for pouring
out the precedents that already clog the due process and equal protection clauses."
23
And indeed, he and others have argued that the precedents on alienage discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause could presumably be invoked to diminish most
differences in the treatment of aliens that might result from reliance on citizenship-
related provisions as a source of rights.24
A second mitigating argument found in the literature-though it has been in most
cases more a suggestion than an elaborated argument-is that a return to
constitutional citizenship as the basis for individual rights is not, in fact, inherently
exclusionary toward aliens. Rather, the suggestion is that aliens can be incorporated
into the turn to constitutional citizenship along with everybody else. Ely proposes a
textual argument to this effect: instead of concluding that "the privileges or
immunities of citizens" 25 are available only to citizens, he maintains that "one may
plausibly read the Privileges or Immunities Clause [to provide] that there is a set of
entitlements, 'the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,' which
states are not to deny to anyone [including aliens]. In other words, the reference to
citizens may define the class of rights rather than limit the class of beneficiaries."
26
Similarly, though in a broader vein, Phillip Bobbit suggests that
reconceptualizing constitutional rights as flowing from a structural principle of
23 Kurland, supra note 9, at 420.
24 See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 9, at 419 ("The equal protection clause has already required
that classifications be rationalized so that differences in treatment between aliens and citizens
would have to be particularly justified."). Tribe makes a similar argument: grounding new rights in
the Privileges or Immunities or Citizenship Clauses would seem, he acknowledges, to leave aliens
behind. Yet "by prohibiting discrimination in legal rights among all persons-citizens and aliens
alike-[the Equal Protection Clause could], in effect... secure the 'privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States' to all persons within the jurisdiction of a particular state." TRIBE,
supra note 18, at 1325. Under this approach, the Equal Protection Clause would be used to
piggyback onto the Privileges or Immunities Clause to accomplish for aliens indirectly what cannot
(by dint of text) be done directly. In the end, however, Tribe concludes that Equal Protection would
not require perfectly identical treatment of citizens and aliens. "With respect to entitlement to at
least some of the privileges or immunities of national citizenship, aliens and citizens may simply
not be similarly situated," he writes. Id.
Of course, this supplementarity strategy raises various questions about exactly how rights
would be divided up under a citizenship-centered rights regime: which rights would remain
personhood rights and which would end up as rights of citizenship? If this approach left most of
the rights enjoyed by aliens intact, it would seem to do little toward rationalizing our existing due
process and equal protection based fundamental rights doctrine, the pursuit of which has been a
prime motivator for citizenship revivalists in the first place.
25 The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONsT.
amend. XIV, § 1.
26 ELY, supra note 19.
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citizenship (such as that proposed by Charles Black) need not be read as inherently
exclusionary toward aliens. Bobbit specifically rejects the view that there exists an
"antinomy between citizen and alien"; he instead proposes that "for constitutional
purposes," the alien "be analogized to the citizen, with only such exceptions---voting
and office-holding-as the Constitution itself provides."27
Crucially, neither Ely nor Bobbit maintain that aliens can escape marginalization
under a revived citizenship regime by becoming citizens via naturalization. Rather,
their argument is that aliens, while they are aliens-qua aliens-can be said to enjoy
citizenship, or should not be precluded from enjoying citizenship, in at least some
respects.
It is this second effort to ameliorate constitutional citizenship's alienage problem
that interests me in this paper. The notion that a return to constitutional citizenship as
the central foundation for rights need not leave aliens behind is quite fascinating. It
leads to the apparently paradoxical idea that aliens can enjoy, or partake in, some
aspects of citizenship. It points to the prospect, in other words, of "alien citizenship ' 28
under our constitution.
At first glance, the notion of alien citizenship may seem impossible-baldly
contradictory by its terms.29 Yet it has not seemed so to all observers. And the fact
that this idea has not seemed impossible--including to several of constitutional law
2 7 PHLP BOBBIT, CONsTrLToNALFATE: THEORY OFThECONSTrUTION 89 (1982); see also
Note, Membership Has Its Privileges and Immunities: Congressional Power to Define and
Enforce the Rights of National Citizenship, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1925, 1931 n.43 (1989).
[Understanding citizenship) as a binding relationship between the individual and the political
community, under which the polity is obligated to guard and respect certain fundamental
rights of the individual... does not necessarily exclude aliens from the protection of these
same fundamental rights. Aliens have generally been extended the same individual guarantees
as those enjoyed by persons who have achieved the legal status of citizenship.
Id.
28 See Karst, supra note 6, at 25 (describing alien rights cases of the 1970s as "promot[ing]
the principle of equal citizenship").
29 For earlier articulations of the notion of the "citizenship of aliens," see Bosniak, supra note
21, at 29-35; Bosniak, supra note 17; see also Rut Rubio Matin, National ijmits to Democratic
Citizenship, 11 RATIO JURIs 51,54-55 (1998) (urging recognition of the "democratic citizenship"
of resident aliens); Virginie Guiraudon, Citizenship RightsforNon-citizens: France, Germany and
the Netherlands, in CHALLENGE To THE NATION-STATE: IMMIGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE AND
THE UNrrED STATES 272 (Christian Joppke ed., 1998) (describing civil, social and political rights
enjoyed by aliens as "citizenship rights").
The concept of "alien citizenship" may resemble the sort of Zen Buddhist Koan Charles Black
refers to in describing the apparently paradoxical notion of "substantive due process." BLAcK,
supra note 5. In a more postmodem vein, we might characterize "alien citizenship" as a
"performative contradiction." See Bosniak, supra note 17, at 981 (quoting Judith Butler, Sovereign
Performatives in the Contemporary Scene of Utterance, 23 CRmCAL INQUIRY 350, 366-67
(1997)).
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scholarship's most eminent commentators-is itself quite striking. These scholars'
conviction that a (re)tum to citizenship as a basis for constitutional rights need not
imply the exclusion of aliens-and indeed might well bring them along-raises
intriguing and important questions about the nature of our understandings of
constitutional citizenship in broader terms.
In Part II of this article, I address the following question: in order for us to hold
that grounding rights in constitutional citizenship would not necessarily entail a loss
of rights to aliens-in order to assume that rights based in citizenship might well
extend to aliens-what sort of conception of citizenship must we maintain? The
answer, it seems to me, is that our conception of citizenship must be a divided one. It
must be a conception that approaches citizenship status and citizenship rights as
analytically distinct facets of citizenship which are not always in alignment. Such a
conception, I will argue, is already common to us by way of the idea of "second-class
citizenship." The second-class citizen is one who is a formal subject of citizenship-a
status citizen-but who is nevertheless denied full enjoyment of citizenship's
substance, including rights associated with citizenship. The construct of alien
citizenship is precisely the converse; it presupposes that those lacking the formal
status of citizenship nevertheless enjoy rights commonly associated with citizenship.
To an important extent, this characterization seems to conform to our current
constitutional practice: status noncitizens in the United States today enjoy a
substantial range of rights of a kind which many commentators have sought to
characterize in the language of citizenship. Yet assuming we do want to characterize
rights as a kind of citizenship, 30 the question remains whether the idea of alien
citizenship is normatively defensible, and whether it is even coherent when
considered in light of citizenship's own substantive values and commitments. On the
normative question, I argue that in light of our constitutional tradition's commitment
to rights for persons, alien citizenship cannot be described as morally unjust in the
way that second-class citizenship is.
I also contend in Part aI, however, that the idea of citizenship as rights is itself
beset by normative tensions which make the notion of alien citizenship fundamentally
unstable. For while the idea of constitutional citizenship-equal citizenship-is
characterized by a powerful commitment to universality, and as such supports a
regime of rights based on personhood, constitutional citizenship also embodies an
exclusive, nationalist political vision. These two commitments are usually seen as
30 Citizenship has long been associated with the enjoyment of rights. In social theory, the
approach is most closely linked with the work of T.H. Marshall. See T.H. MARSHAiL, CMZENSHIP
AND SOCLAL CLASS (1949). But citizenship-as-rights represents only one among several
conventional understandings of citizenship. Scholars have distinguished among several
understandings or, alternatively, "dimensions" of citizenship, though their formulations vary.
Virtually all distinguish between rights-based and republican conceptions, and others stress cultural
and legal understandings as well. An important essay is Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 2. For
further discussion on the multiple understandings of citizenship, see Bosniak, supra note 2.
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relevant to different spheres: citizenship's ethic of universality is presumed to pertain
to relations among members of the community, while its nationalism is regarded as
relevant to the community's borders. Yet the category of alienage brings these two
commitments into tension with one another. Although the lives of aliens are
significantly shaped by reference to citizenship's universalist commitments,
citizenship's nationalism also fundamentally structures their status and experience.
I therefore conclude that the suggestion by Ely, Bobbit, and other scholars that
aliens can be the subjects of citizenship, and that reviving constitutional citizenship
need not result in a diminution of rights for aliens, is quite plausible, but only to a
point. Aliens may enjoy substantive citizenship as constitutional persons, but they
remain national outsiders in important respects as well. In the end, alien citizenship is
necessarily a partial or incomplete citizenship.
Although in Part III, I enter the fray to some extent over the proper place of
noncitizens in the constitutional order, this essay is fundamentally conceptual in
nature. My principle concern is to show that our understandings of constitutional
citizenship are segmented and divided in nature. They are divided analytically as
between citizenship as status and citizenship as rights, and they are divided
normatively; the constitutional ideal of equal citizenship contains both universalist
and nationalist commitments.
My emphasis here on citizenship as a divided construct bears affinity with other
recent work on the nature and history of citizenship in the United States.
Constitutional historians, for example, have pointed out that the rights that comprise
the enjoyment of citizenship in this country have never been cut from a single cloth,
but entail a range of entirely distinguishable sorts of entitlements and protections.31
This work, which focuses on the distinctions between civil, political, social, and
(more recently) economic conceptions and practices of citizenship, is useful not
merely because it allows us to think about the enjoyment of, and the exclusion from,
citizenship in more complex terms than we are usually accustomed to doing, but also
because it raises the possibility that citizenship is not an all-or-nothing affair but,
rather, a construct which is internally complex and segmented. Nancy Cott's work
31 In the nineteenth century, American political thought distinguished between natural rights,
civil rights, political rights, and social rights. See Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women's
Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934, 103 AM. HISTORICAL REv. 1440, 1448-49 (1998);
Earl Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Hous. L. REv. 221 (1987); Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1241 (1998). Citizenship was associated with only
the first two of these. Political rights became integral to our conception of citizenship only over the
course of the twentieth century. A number of scholars have recently urged expansion of the class of
rights associated with citizenship still further by advocating recognition of what some have termed
"economic citizenship." See, e.g., Forbath, supra note 16; Karst, supra note 16; ALICE KESSLER-
HARRIS, IN PURSUTrr OF EQurrY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEsT FOR ECONOMIC C=IZENSHIP IN
20m CENTURY AMERICA (2001).
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makes this kind of approach especially clear.32 In an article on the history of women's
citizenship in the United States, she shows that while white women in nineteenth
century America enjoyed citizenship in "nominal" or "minimal" terms, they were
nevertheless denied many of the rights we now consider fundamental to citizenship in
its fullest sense.33 In the course of the study, she observes that "citizenship can be
delivered in different degrees of permanence or strength ..... Citizenship is not a
definitive either/or proposition-you are or you are not-but a compromisable
one."
34
Cott's notion of divisible, compromisable citizenship is highly relevant here. The
status of aliens underlines the fragmented quality of citizenship as we conventionally
understand it. This is a fragmentation that produces diverse sorts of partial citizenship
identities, including the anomalous identity of the alien citizen. What is distinctive
about the case of alienage is that it introduces into the mix an aspect of citizenship
that most constitutional theorists who focus on rights tend to ignore-citizenship as
formal national membership status. It is the uneasy relationship between citizenship
rights and citizenship status, as well as between the universalist and particularist
commitments embodied in the idea of citizenship as rights itself, that I address in the
current paper.
II. CrrlzENsIiP's SUBJECTS AND CIrlzENsHIP's SUBSTANCE
Interpreters of the Constitution have long been uncertain about precisely what the
Fourteenth Amendment has to say about citizenship. Everyone, of course,
acknowledges that passage of the Amendment radically altered American
constitutional understandings of citizenship. We recognize, first of all, that the
Amendment made citizenship a matter of national law and national concern. Whereas
prior to its passage, the meaning and regulation of citizenship were understood to be
matters reserved to the states, the new Amendment "decisively repudiate[d] state
sovereignty" 35 and signaled a fundamental realignment of the relationship between
the state and federal governments.
Everyone, furthermore, recognizes that the Amendment's Citizenship Clause
served to reverse the Supreme Court decision in Dred Scott, which held that persons
of African descent did not and could not possess citizenship. 36 In so doing, the
Amendment provided "a definition of citizenship in which race played no part."
37
Most commentators read the Fourteenth Amendment as defining the criteria for
32 Cott, supra note 31.
33 Id. at 1448.
34 Id. at 1441-42.
35 Christopher Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution, 69 S. CAL L REv. 47,
71 (1995) ("[The clause's] declaration of citizenship decisively repudiates state sovereignty.").
36 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
37 Bickel, supra note 1, at 374.
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citizenship in more general terms as well;38 the Amendment "tells us who are citizens
of the United States," 39 thereby designating the class of formal members of the
nation.40
Yet while most commentators agree on these fundamentals, there looms beyond
them a host of uncertainties about the Fourteenth Amendment's vision of, and
mandate concerning, citizenship. In recent years, divisions around these questions
have mostly found expression in two broad debates.
The first debate concerns the question of citizenship's substantive meaning and
scope. While scholars increasingly concur that constitutional citizenship has been
wrongfully neglected, if not repressed, for too long, the literature is replete with
heated exchanges over precisely what effect the return to citizenship would or will
have on constitutional jurisprudence--on the constitutional jurisprudence of rights,
especially. Scholars have debated, among other things, whether the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, the Citizenship Clause, or both should be read to incorporate the
federal Bill of Rights or a much narrower set of rights;41 whether the protections of
citizenship are confined to antidiscrimination guarantees or embody protection of
those fundamental rights now guaranteed under substantive due process theory--and
38 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872) (describing the first
sentence of the frst Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as providing "a definition of
citizenship").
39 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 191 (1999); see
also Eisgruber, supra note 35, at 78 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment "articulat[es] citizen
identity").
40 The Citizenship Clause declares as citizens all persons bom or naturalized in the United
States. Congress possesses naturalization power under Article I, Section 8, pursuant to which it
may define the criteria for accession to citizenship after birth. It is, therefore, the Citizenship
Clause, together with the naturalization decisions which Congress may make pursuant to the
naturalization power, that defines the class of citizens.
While there have been disputes over the years about the precise contours of the class of
Fourteenth Amendment citizens---the most recent concerning the status of U.S.-bom children of
undocumented immigrants-on the whole, the Amendment's definition of the citizenship class is
uncontroversial.
41 For the pro-incorporation position, see, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BIL OF RIGHTS (1986); and Kevin
Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-
House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643,648 (2000) (arguing that "the Framers' purpose of incorporating
Bill of Rights freedoms through the Privileges or Immunities Clause may be accomplished without
disturbing the Slaughter-House precedent"). For arguments urging a narrower, nonincorporationist
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OFTHE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 22, 31-32,38 (1977); and
Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original
Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
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perhaps other unenumerated rights as well; 42 and finally, whether the enjoyment of
citizenship necessarily entails social and economic, as well as political and civil, rights
for society's members.43
The second major debate on the subject is a debate over the significance of
citizenship in our constitutional system. Alexander Bickel famously launched the
modem version of this debate by espousing the view that possession of citizenship
status has been, and should remain, fundamentally insignificant in the American
constitutional order.44 Many scholars have since attempted in a variety of ways to
contest this view; some dispute the historical account,45 and others have urged that
42 For arguments on behalf of an anti-discrimination reading of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, see, for example, John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101
YALE L.J. 1385, 1388 (1992) (providing an "equality-based reading" of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, and concluding that "the main point of the clause is to require that every state
give the same privileges and immunities of state citizenship... to all of its citizens"); Graglia,
supra note 7 (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause, like the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, was meant to ensure the protection of civil rights for blacks); BERGER, supra
note 41, at 20-36. For opposing views, see ELY, supra note 19, at 24 ("[It is no small problem for
the [anti-discrimination] interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that it would render
the Equal Protection Clause superfluous .... [The Clause] seems to announce rather plainly that
there is a set of entitlements that no state is to take away."); Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming
Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L REv. 1 (1996) (reading the
Privileges or Immunities Clause to prohibit states from abridging a body of preexisting national
rights); Note, supra note 27, at 1937 (suggesting a reading of "citizenship" as providing certain
"nontextual guarantees" to members of the political community); Richard L. Aynes, On
Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 104 (1993).
43 The debate is, in part, historical. Some scholars have argued the rights the framers sought to
guarantee by way of the Privileges or Immunities Clause were only civil, and not social or political
rights. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Citizenship and the Constitution: A History and Critique of the
Supreme Court's Alienage Jurisprudence, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1135,1190 (1996); Rosen, supra note
31, at 1245 (describing the Framers' "broader purpose... to extend civil rights (or privileges and
immunities of citizenship), but not political or social rights, to all citizens, black and white, on
equal terms"); see also Daniel J. Levin, Reading the Privileges or Immunities Clause: Textual
Irony, Analytical Revisionism, and an Interpretive Truce, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 569, 571
(2000) (arguing that "the normative content of the 'privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States' is embedded in conceptions of structural participation of self-government rather
than in more general notions of personal liberty") (citation omitted).
In contrast to these readings, a number of scholars have argued recently that the rights of
citizenship should be understood, on historical and normative grounds, to entail economic rights.
See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk?
Demoting The Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1771 (1994); Karst,
supra note 16; Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, Your Stake In America, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 249
(1999).
44 Bickel, supra note 1.
45 See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 43, at 1190 ("The text, structure and historyof the Constitution
reflect a keen appreciation of the importance of the political relationships inherent in both state and
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the status of citizenship has, in any event, wrongly been "devalued" and deserves
constitutional prominence and honor.46 Others, however, continue to characterize the
Constitution as centrally committed to the rights of persons, and to normatively
defend such a commitment.
On the face of it, these two debates are intimately related. At the most obvious
level, it will only be worthwhile to engage in protracted debates about the meaning of
citizenship to the extent that we regard citizenship as legally and politically
significant. Yet they are also distinguishable in ways that are conceptually important.
For one thing, the precise object of their concern-the "citizenship" which they
address-is not identical in each case. Those engaged in the debate over the meaning
of citizenship treat citizenship as an ensemble of rights (and sometimes,
responsibilities) enjoyed by community members whose nature and scope require
specification. Those involved in the "significance of citizenship" debate, in contrast,
approach citizenship as a formal legal status and ask what that status means, and what
it ought to mean, in our constitutional system. The two debates also have radically
different starting points with respect to the class of persons deemed to constitute
citizenship's subjects. Those engaged in the "meaning of citizenship" debate presume
at the outset that everyone in the community enjoys the formal status of citizenship,
and instead focus on the nature and distribution of the substantive rights to which
these citizens are entitled. In contrast, those addressing "the significance of
citizenship" begin by assuming that not everyone is a formal citizen, and then go on
to examine the implications of possessing, or not possessing, citizenship status.
national citizenship, as well as the potential relevance of those relationships to the allocation of a
wide variety of rights and benefits.").
46 See Peter H. Schuck, The Devaluation ofAmerican Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 13
(1989).
[Tihe distinctive meaning of American citizenship... has been transformed in recent decades
by a public philosophy that... [has] reduced almost to the vanishing point the marginal value
of citizenship as compared to resident alien status.... Not only do aliens need or want [it] less;
many of those who do want it for their children need expend remarkably little in order to get
it.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Eskridge, supra note 15.
Justice Rehnquist has penned what is probably the most pointed judicial articulation of this
position:
[The Constitution itself recognizes a basic difference between citizens and aliens. That
distinction is constitutionally important in no less than I instances in a political document
noted for its brevity .... In constitutionally defining who is a citizen of the United States,
Congress obviously thought it was doing something and something important. Citizenship
meant something, a status in and relationship with a society which is continuing and more
basic than mere presence or residence.
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,651-52 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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These differences in base line and focus set the debates apart from one another in
conceptual terms, but the distinctions are not merely conceptual. As it happens,
something of a professional divide has developed between those engaged in the two
citizenship debates as well. Whereas the "meaning of citizenship" debate is central
fare in mainstream constitutional theory concerning both rights and democratic self-
governance, the "significance of citizenship" issue has been of special interest to
immigration scholars and those concerned with the status of aliens. Only rarely do
scholars involved in one of these debates cross the line to engage with the other.
This seems to me to be an unfortunate divide. For while the two debates do
indeed address different sorts of questions, these are questions which inevitably bear
very closely on one another. It comes down to this: we cannot think productively
about constitutional citizenship in substantive terms without addressing the question
of citizenship's formal subjects as well. We cannot address constitutional citizenship
conceived as rights without being likewise mindful of the allocation and effect of
national citizenship status--or so I will argue.
But the question remains as to precisely how rights and status bear on one
another. What exactly is the nature of the relationship between citizenship's subjects
and citizenship's substance, between the "who" and the "what" of constitutional
citizenship? This relationship has been extremely complex and uncertain in
constitutional thought. For one thing, it is not always clear on the face of it which of
these aspects of citizenship commentators are addressing in any given context. The
two are often conflated, and they can often be hard to distinguish in any event.47 At
the same time, because constitutional law and commentary on citizenship often treat
substance and subjects as distinct legal concerns which employ distinct analytic and
even normative vocabularies, the relationship between them is rarely directly
considered.
One of the most productive ways, it seems to me, to address the difficult interplay
between citizenship's substance and citizenship's subjects in constitutional law is to
examine it in relation to the constitutional status of aliens. At first glance, alienage
might seem to be a subject wholly encompassed within the "significance of
citizenship" debate, for inquiring about the legal and social differences that
citizenship status makes necessarily entails an inquiry about the difference that
alienage makes as well. 48 But alienage, as it happens, is also significantly implicated
by the "meaning of citizenship" debate. This is because imbuing the idea of
citizenship with greater constitutional meaning-characterizing increasing numbers
of rights and responsibilities in the idiom of citizenship-presents the possibility that
aliens will be excluded from the scope of many of the Constitution's protections
altogether.
4 7 See, e.g., ROGERSM. SMrI, Civic IDEALS: CoNRCrNG VISIONS OFCrrZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY 2 (1997) (describing laws pertaining to acquisition and loss of citizenship status and laws
pertaining to general rights of residents as "citizenship laws").
48 Cf Bosniak, Difference That Alienage Makes, supra note 14.
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While this risk is most often ignored in the literature, we have seen that some
constitutional commentators have recognized it as a real possibility, and have
expressed concern that linking rights to citizenship will cut against enjoyment of
rights by those persons lacking citizenship by legal definition. 49 A few other
commentators, in contrast, have sought to argue that exclusion of aliens is not a
strictly necessary outcome of the revival of constitutional citizenship. They have done
so by positing, as Philip Bobbit writes, that there is no necessary "antinomy between
citizen and alien," 50 and by suggesting that aliens might themselves enjoy some
aspects of constitutional citizenship. 5l
What is significant about such a proposal is that it implicitly relies upon a
conception of citizenship in which citizenship's subjects and citizenship's substance
are not necessarily coextensive but are relatively autonomous from each other. This is
a conception in which a person need not be a citizen in order to enjoy citizenship. It is
the soundness and the implications of this premise with which I am concerned here.
A. Citizenship Minimalism and Its Critics
The Fourteenth Amendment tells us who the nation's citizens are. Yet beyond
designating the class of national citizens, what more about citizenship does the
Fourteenth Amendment have to say? One reading, which has long dominated our
jurisprudence and constitutional thought, is that it says very little else. In this
minimalist reading,52 the effect of the Amendment's Citizenship Clause is almost
entirely definitional. 53 The clause designates a class of national citizens who owe
allegiance to the polity and are in turn guaranteed its protection in the international
sphere.54 And while the Amendment contains the Privileges or Immunities Clause as
well, the longtime interpretation of this clause by the Supreme Court has regarded it
as guaranteeing very little by way of substance to those defined as Fourteenth
Amendment citizens. As is well known, in an 1873 decision not yet overruled, a
majority of the Court held that the privileges or immunities guaranteed in the
Amendment's first clause guaranteed virtually nothing beyond a set of minimal rights
49 See supra text accompanying notes 11-21.
50 Boanrrr, supra note 27, at 88.
51 See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
5 2 ALEXANDERM. BICKEL, THEMORALITYOFCONSENT51 (1975) (describingthe "traditional
minimal content of the concept of citizenship").
53 This characterization seems questionable: describing the clause as "defining citizenship"
suggests that it provides a definition of what citizenship substantively entails. As Douglas Smith
has written, the clause is better viewed as "defin[ing] the conditions sufficient for attaining the
status of 'citizen.' Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth Arendment, 34 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 681, 693 (1997).
54 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 166 (1875).
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already guaranteed or implicit elsewhere in the Constitution. 55 Until fairly recently,
most scholars have taken largely for granted both the Slaughter-House Court's
evisceration of the clause and the development of the jurisprudence of individual
rights under the aegis of personhood by way of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses.56
On this traditional account, then, the Fourteenth Amendment does no more than
specify who is a citizen, and offers an exceptionally thin conception of what
citizenship is. Citizenship, in this understanding, is "membership of a nation,"57 and
not a great deal more.58 As Bickel put it: "[w]hile we now have a definition of
citizenship in the Constitution, we... set very little store by it."'59
55 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), has been
characterized by some scholars as representing a major step toward an unravelling of The
Slaughter-House Cases. See authorities cited in note 35, supra. Determining whether this reading
of the Saenz is overly optimistic will have to await the further decisions from the Court.
56 For arguments that The Slaughter-House Cases badly distorted constitutional rights
doctrine by, in effect, forcing the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to bear the weight for
which they were, and are, ill-equipped, see, for example, TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1317 (noting that
for many constitutional scholars, "the problems [associated with] the textual gymnastics arguably
necessary to find protection of substantive rights in a provision whose words seem most apparently
concerned with process-have become insuperable"); Kurland, supra note 9, at 406 ("[O]nly the
[PIrivileges or [limmunities [Cilause speaks to matters of substance; certainly the language of due
process and equal protection does not."); and ELY, supra note 19, at 18, 22-30 (arguing "that
'substantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness"' and
urging new attention to the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a source of substantive rights).
For a contrary view on the effect of the The Slaughter-House Cases, see Walter Dellinger,
Remarks on Jeffrey Rosen's Paper, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1293, 1293 (1998).
Although Slaughter-House was wrong, I have never agreed with the many scholars who
believe that its fundamental error was that it eliminated the correct clause for the national
protection of individual rights (the Privileges and Immunities Clause) thereby 'forcing' later
interpreters to rely upon the wrong clause (the Liberty/Due Process Clause) .... Having the
Due Process Clause do the work intended for the Privileges and Immunities Clause may be
awkward, but it is not a constitutional tragedy.
Id.; see also Rosen, supra note 31, at 1242-43 (arguing that "the new conventional wisdom about
the virtues of resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause is wrong .... Overruling Slaughter-
House would solve so few of the problems in modem Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence that
it's not clear that a textualist revival would be worth the trouble").
57 Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 165-66.
58 As the Court in Slaughter-House described, the reach of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause imparts only rights of national citizenship, which confers upon the individual the right 'to
come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact
any business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in
administering its functions' ... [to]free access to its seaports... to the subtreasuries, land offices,
and courts of justice in the several States.' ... [and] to demand the care and protection of the
Federal government over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or within the
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Against this minimalist reading, contemporary scholars urging the revival of the
idea of constitutional citizenship have protested that the Fourteenth Amendment has
much more to say about citizenship than this account acknowledges. Specifically,
they argue that beyond defining the class of citizenship's subjects, the idea of
citizenship carries with it substantive rights which are far more elaborate and robust
than the minimalist reading allows. Some would locate these in the Citizenship
Clause itself; they argue that implicit in the constitutional definition of citizenship's
subjects is a commitment to provide fundamental rights to citizens.60 Others maintain
that the Framers entrusted citizenship's substance to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, 6' while others still read a commitment to substantive citizenship values in the
equal protection clause by way of the principle of equal citizenship.62 Some would
jurisdiction of a foreign government." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (quoting Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867)).
59 Bickel, supra note 1, at 378.
60 See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 5, at 33-66; Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging, Protection and
Equality: The Neglected Citizenship Clause and the Limits of Federalism, 62 U. Prrr. L REV. 281
(2000); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Women and the Promise ofEqual Citizenship, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN &
L. 51 (1998); Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV.
387, 395 (1967).
[Tlhe national citizenship bestowed upon the Negro by the first sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment contained as an essential attribute of this new status the right to be free from the
stigma of inferiority implicit in the institution of slavery, the right to be free from
discrimination by reason of race in the exercise of rights or privileges generally available to
white citizens.
Id.; see also Smith, supra note 53, at 690 (arguing that "[tIhe Citizenship Clause of Section 1 may
be interpreted to represent a guarantee binding upon both the state and federal governments of
certain fundamental rights inherent in the concept of citizenship as understood at the time of
ratification of the Amendment"); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the
Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 912-13 (1986) ("Understood
within the context of the Declaration of Independence, natural rights theory, and nationalist
constitutionalism, the Citizenship [C]lause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment delegated the
constitutional authority to secure affirmatively the fundamental rights of American citizens.");
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the Constitutional Relation Between
Principle and Prudence, 43 DUKE L.J. 1, 45 (1993) (suggesting that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the Citizenship Clause and ensure "the benefits
government ought to provide to a free people-such as liberty, security and justice"); William
Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183
(2000) (urging that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses "be read as guarantees fulfilling
the promise of citizenship made in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Tribe, supra
note 3, at 126-27 (describing the citizenship clause as "an underutilized constitutional provision if
ever there was one").
61 As John Ely writes, "it was probably the clause from which the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment expected most." ELY, supra note 19, at 22.
62 Karst, supra note 6, at 4 (describing citizenship principle as giving "substantive content [to]
the [E]qual [P]rotection clause").
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confine the rights of citizenship to civil and/or political rights, while others insist that
constitutional citizenship entails commitments to economic and social equality as
well. 6
3
In each case, though, revivalists want to press beyond the minimalist reading of
Fourteenth Amendment citizenship in two respects. First, they maintain that the
Fourteenth Amendment should be read not merely to designate citizenship's subjects
but also to provide substantive guarantees associated with citizenship. Second, they
contend that these guarantees are thicker and more meaningful than the traditional
minimalist account allows.
As to why constitutional citizenship should be understood more thickly and
substantively, scholars' rationales have varied. Some analysts regard the minimalist
account as simply mistaken as an historical matter; in their view, citizenship
minimalism ignores the intent of the Framers and the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.64 Others contend that, beyond history and text, citizenship
minimalism obscures the meaning of the Constitution in a deeper sense. Whether
animated by an anti-caste vision of the Constitution or by principles of republican
self-government,65 the ideal of citizenship is understood to represent a core source of
rights and responsibilities in our constitutional nomos.
I have some sympathy with the view, espoused by critics of citizenship
minimalism, that the idea of constitutional citizenship should be read to possess a
63 For arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of citizenship rights pertained
only to civil rights, see Maltz, supra note 43. But see Harris, supra note 9 (for a discussion of
citizenship as political rights). For arguments that citizenship has to be understood to include
economic and social rights, see Forbath, supra note 16, and Karst, supra note 16 (discussing
economic rights), and Balkin, infra note 66 (discussing social rights).
64 There is by now a substantial literature on the historical origins and political context of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and many scholars have concluded that the Framers affirmatively
intended to imbue the concept of citizenship with real constitutional effect. See, e.g., ELY, supra
note 19; Harrison, supra note 42; Maltz, supra note 31; Maltz, supra note 43.
65 Some characterize the Constitution as embodying an anti-caste ethic; in this view, the
Fourteenth Amendment should be read as a response to the subordination of African-Americans-
and by implication, to other oppressed groups as well. The concept of equal citizenship-
understood as full and meaningful membership for all-figures centrally in this narrative. See, for
example, Karst, supra note 6, at 17.
[The Framers] chose to cast the amendment in general terms, declining to use the language of
specific rights and particular groups that they had used in the 1866 Act. It was this choice that
gave the principle of equal citizenship its capacity to grow into a protection of other groups
and other rights.
Id.; see also, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 (1997). Others
regard Constitutional citizenship as embodying commitments to democratic self-government and
republican virtue. See, e.g., inda McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-
Revivalists, 75 Cm.-Ksxr L. REv. 301 (2000); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493 (1988).
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meaning that goes beyond providing for the sheer delineation of national status.
Notice, however, that to the extent we adopt a more robust reading of constitutional
citizenship, we are presuming a dual conception of Fourteenth Amendment
citizenship, under which the Amendment's provisions work both to designate the
class of persons entitled to citizenship and to set out a substantive vision of
citizenship rights. This conception may represent a more complete accounting of
citizenship's meaning under the Constitution, but it introduces complexities as well.
Specifically, it opens up a variety of analytical and normative questions concerning
the nature of the relationship between status citizenship and rights citizenship in the
first instance.
B. "Mere Status" and "Equal Citizenship": The Second-Class Citizenship
Critique
In discussions of citizenship in political and social theory, it is common for
scholars to distinguish between "thin" and "thick" versions of citizenship. Thin
citizenship is citizenship-as-status, "mere status" in the disparaging phrase of some
commentators. 66 This thin version of citizenship is contrasted with more robust,
substantive conceptions. Such conceptions vary in kind: some scholars focus on
citizenship as the meaningful enjoyment of rights, while others, in a more civic
republican vein, approach citizenship as a kind of democratic engagement and self-
governance. In either case, however, a hierarchy is posited: to possess the legal status
of citizenship is to enjoy citizenship only in the most formal and nominal sense. The
true and full enjoyment of citizenship requires much more.67
In the constitutional literature, some accounts of the relationship between
citizenship status and citizenship rights employ a similar hierarchical framework, with
rights the superior, and status the inferior, term. The work of Kenneth Karst is
especially illustrative. Karst describes the Fourteenth Amendment as containing two
conceptions of citizenship: a "narrow" conception, pursuant to which citizenship
constitutes legal status, and a "broader conception" which embodies, in his argument,
66 See, e.g., Chantal Mouffe, Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community, in
DIMENSIONS OFRADIcALDEMOcRAcY: PLURALISM, CIZENSHIP, COMMUNITY 225,227 (Chantal
Mouffe ed., 1992) (arguing that "liberalism ... reduced citizenship to a mere legal status");
Sanford Levinson, National Loyalty, Communalism, and the Professional Identity of Lawyers, 7
YALE J.L. & HUM. 49,53-54 (1995) (distinguishing between the concepts of "good citizens" and
"mere citizens").
67 For a useful, and elaborate, characterization of "thin" and "thick" conceptions of
citizenship, see Rainer Baubock, Differentiating Citizenship, in INCLUSION/ExcLuSION (Alison
Woodward ed., forthcoming). In contrast to the account here, however, Baubock characterizes as
"thin" not merely conceptions of citizenship-as-status but also conceptions of citizenship-as-rights
which do not entail corresponding obligations or cultural commitments. ld at 5-7. He propounds a
conception of "thick" citizenship that is far more communitarian and nationalistic than the one I
am describing here.
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nationality laws-which, among other things, denationalized American women who
married foreigners-makes the point vividly.77 So too does the growing literature on
the exclusion of Puerto Ricans from constitutional citizenship status.78 Possession of
the "mere status" of citizenship does not appear so trivial a matter when approached
in the context of these struggles.79 This account, furthermore, obscures the ways in
which a lack of the status of citizenship itself-in the form of alienage-sometimes
serves as a basis for caste-like treatment and discrimination.80
But beyond this insensitivity to the continuing significance and intractability of
citizenship status questions, there lies another, more conceptual, difficulty with the
second-class citizenship critique. I have said that commentators often treat citizenship
status and citizenship rights as elements in a hierarchy, with status the lesser of the
two values. Yet the hierarchy posited is usually not one of otherwise independent
variables. Instead, the possession of citizenship status is often regarded as logically
prior to-as a necessary but insufficient condition for-the enjoyment of citizenship
rights. In this account, citizenship status is assumed to be an embryonic form of
citizenship, an indispensable antecedent to citizenship in its more substantive mode.
However, conceiving of the relationship between status and rights this way can
be misleading. Citizenship status is not, in fact, always an antecedent to citizenship
rights. While citizenship status is a condition precedent for the enjoyment of some
rights, there are many rights that many citizenship revivalists would want to
characterize as rights of citizenship-expressive and associational rights, for instance,
or procedural rights in the criminal context, or the right to attend public schools with
other children- for which citizenship status is not a prerequisite at all. Such rights
have been regarded, instead, as attaching to persons-territorially-present persons,
often through the constitutional values of equal protection and due process.
And indeed, there is one particular right-that of voting-which today is very
closely associated with citizenship both in popular understandings and in political
theory,8' and which, in recent decades, has been confined to people who possess
7 7 See IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHIE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996);
John Tehranian, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial
Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817 (2000); Cott, supra note 31; Leti Volpp, Dependent
Citizens and Marital Expatriates (forthcoming).
78 See generally FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO Rico, AMERICAN EXPANsION AND
THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
79 In a recent essay, Karst recognizes this point. See Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Law, and
the American Nation, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 595, 596 (2000) (arguing that while
Alexander Bickel considered the status of citizenship "a trifling matter,... to an African-American
living under Jim Crow, or to many a resident alien today, the status was and is a prize to strive
for .... The formal status of citizenship can seem trifling only when you are able to take it for
granted.").
80 See generally, Bosniak, supra note 17.
81 Voting has not always been regarded as a necessary incident of citizenship. See, e.g., Minor
v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1875); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 628 (1904)
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citizenship status, which nevertheless was not limited to status citizens historically. As
a number of scholars have chronicled in recent years, aliens possessed the right to
vote in many states through the late nineteenth century, and even today, they vote in a
handful of local elections. 82
The point is that citizenship status does not always serve as the ground floor in
the larger edifice of constitutional citizenship. Instead we find that just as citizenship
status hasn't always entailed citizenship rights, the possession of rights doesn't always
require prior possession of citizenship status. Rights and status, in short, are relatively
autonomous.83
C. Alienage and the Citizenship Revival
This relative autonomy as between citizenship status and citizenship rights goes a
long way to explaining the suggestion of those constitutional scholars who have
considered the alienage question that, notwithstanding potential deleterious effects on
aliens, the revival of constitutional citizenship ultimately need not undercut aliens'
rights. Aliens can enjoy much in the way of rights-citizenship, even if they lack status-
citizenship by definition. Citizenship, in other words, is a divided condition.
It is this conception of a divided citizenship that enabled Charles Black to write
that "filling with content the concept of citizenship need not result in neglect of the
("Citizenship and suffrage are by no means inseparable; the latter is not one of the universal,
fundamental, inalienable rights with which men are endowed by their Creator .... ); see also Cott,
supra note 31.
8 2 GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 63-71, 139-49 (1996); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The
Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings ofAlien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391
(1993); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L.
REv. 1092 (1977).
83 The concept of "relative autonomy" has often been used to describe the nature of a
relationship between social domains or phenomena in empirical terms; it is meant to convey the
idea that two domains (or phenomena) are neither entirely reducible to one other, nor entirely
independent. The term has its origins in Marxist thought, and was a key concept of Critical Legal
Studies' accounts of law's relationship to other social fields. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Critical
Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 101 (1984). Today, legal scholars of many stripes rely on the
idea to acknowledge both "the obvious influences running, in both directions, between law and
other social spheres," and, at the same time, the fact that law must be treated "in its own terms, not
the terms of some other field or discipline .... Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the "Relative
Autonomy" of Law, 19 CARDOzO L. REV. 1987, 1990 (1998).
My use of the term here is meant to convey not an empirical but a logical or conceptual
relationship. My argument is simply that in conventional constitutional thought, rights-citizenship
does not depend entirely on possession of status-citizenship, nor does enjoyment of status-
citizenship entail, necessarily, enjoyment of citizenship rights. These dimensions of citizenship, in
other words, are not collapsible one into the other; they are closely-related and partly overlapping,
but substantially independent as well.
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rights of aliens among us." 84 Rather, Black argues the grounding of rights in
citizenship should result in the further protection of aliens--"lawfully resident
aliens," he qualifies---"for their position is in many respects and for many purposes
soundly to be analogized to that of citizens."85 Likewise, it is this sort of disjuncture
between status and rights that John Ely invoked when he suggested that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause need not be read to protect citizens only; instead, he maintains,
it can plausibly be read to mean that "there is a set of entitlements, 'the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States,' which states are not to deny to
anyone,"86 aliens included. The phrase "privileges or immunities of citizens," he
writes, "define[s] the class of rights rather than limit[s] the class of beneficiaries." 87
And it is with this conception of the relative autonomy of citizenship's subjects
and substance implicitly in mind that Philip Bobbit could criticize the assumption
"that 'alien' and 'citizen' are opposites sharing no characteristics, defined as
negations of one another."88 Bobbit would presumably concur that alien and citizen
are, to some degree, opposing categories in the domain of formal citizenship status.
After all, our immigration law defines the category "alien" precisely as "any person
not a citizen" of the United States. 89 But with regard to substantive citizenship-
understood here as rights---the relationship, he suggests, is far more subtle and
complex.90
Kenneth Karst' s discussion of the alienage question in his early work is a notable
example of constitutional theory employing a divided conception of citizenship. Karst
is a longtime proponent of revitalizing the normative ideal of citizenship as a basis for
84 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3,
10(1970).
85 Id. at 10 n.38.
86 ELY, supra note 19, at 25 (emphasis added). Ely recognizes that on its face, the clause's
language appears to "limit its protection to United States citizens." Id. at 24-25. In response he
writes:
I certainly agree that we should defer to clear constitutional language: for one thing it is the
best possible evidence of purpose. But when the usual reading is out of accord with what we
are quite certain was the purpose, we owe it to the Framers and ourselves at least to take a
second look at the language .... Since everyone seems to agree that [the non-exclusionary]
construction would better reflect what we know of the purpose, and since it is one the
language will bear comfortably, it is hard to imagine why it shouldn't be followed.
Id.
87 Id.
88 BOBBT, supra note 27, at 89.
89 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(3) (1994) ('The term 'alien' means anyperson not a citizen ornational
of the United States.").
90 Bobbitt writes that the relationship between citizen and alien is not necessarily an
"antinomy." BOBBrrr, supra note 27, at 88. It is, rather, "a chiaroscuric relationship," one "which
may be found in Aristotle but is not a relationship established anywhere in the Constitution." Id.
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constitutional rights, though unlike many other scholars, he has argued that the
principle of equal citizenship is best housed, not in the Citizenship Clause or the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, but in the Equal Protection Clause.91 He
acknowledges that this may seem counterintuitive; after all, he notes that it is the
former clauses that expressly address the subject of citizenship. 92 Yet, Karst endorses
the Equal Protection Clause as a textual foundation for equal citizenship for several
reasons.
First, he notes that there is value and safety in precedent: "we already have a store
of well-developed equal protection doctrine embodying the principle of equal
citizenship.... It seems sensible to leave the principle where it took root" 93 Moreover,
he contends (contrary to the weight of more recent opinion on the matter) that the
Equal Protection Clause "shows every sign of being able to bear the full meaning of
the equal citizenship principle."94 There is, in other words, no intrinsic reason of
doctrinal integrity or coherence to depart from our recent interpretive practice.
However, for Karst, the most important reason for sticking with the Equal Protection
Clause is that it extends its protection "not only to 'citizens' but to every 'person."'95
This is, for him, a signal virtue. It is a virtue because it means the clause is maximally
inclusive, as the equal citizenship principle ought to be. It is a virtue, in particular,
precisely because the Equal Protection Clause does not confine its protections to
citizens-and Karst maintains, "it is important to extend most of the content of the
equal citizenship principle to aliens."96
Now this is a very striking position: Karst urges retention of the Equal Protection
Clause as the textual site of the equal citizenship principle precisely because the Equal
Protection Clause does not limit its protective scope to citizens. Karst himself
acknowledges the apparent paradox; on introducing the argument, he requests of his
readers "the suspension of incredulity."9 7 He goes on to explain his view that, "for
most purposes aliens are entitled to be regarded as respected participants in our
national society, even though they lack citizenship in the narrow sense. The broader
principle of equal citizenship extends its core values to noncitizens because for most
purposes they are members of our society."98
91 Karst, supra note 6, at 42-46.
9 2 Id. at 42-44.
9 3 Id. at 43-44.
9 4 Id. at 43.
95 Id. at 44.
9 6 1d. at 44-45.
97 Karst, supra note 6, at 44.
98 Id. at 45. Karst suggests that noncitizens may rightly be denied political (though not other)
rights: "[since] we are a political community, and aliens are members of other political
communities, it may be permissible for a state to restrict political participation . I.." d. Of course,
many citizens-increasing numbers of them-are members of other political communities as well,
yet we do not disenfranchise them on this basis. For a useful recent overview of the subject of dual
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Karst thus employs his preference for substantive over formal citizenship to urge
inclusion of formal noncitizens within citizenship's substantive scope. Aliens' lack of
the "narrow" citizenship of status does not require them to be denied the "broader"
citizenship of membership because status-citizenship, in his formulation, is not a
precondition for equal citizenship.
What each of these scholars shares in common is the conviction that locating the
idea of citizenship at the center of the constitutional discourse of rights need not entail
the wholesale exclusion of aliens. This conviction presupposes that citizenship is not
a monolithic whole, but rather a compound and ultimately severable concept:
citizenship's subjects and its substance-its "beneficiaries" and its "rights," in Ely's
terms99-are treated as discontinuous. Just as being a citizen does not guarantee
(although it should, all agree) any particular citizenship substance, enjoying
citizenship does not require being a citizen in any formal sense.100 In this
understanding, citizenship status and citizenship rights are simply nonconvergent.
D. The Prevailing View: Citizenship For Citizens
The reading these scholars give to the status of alienage under an enhanced
citizenship rights regime in constitutional law is not, to be sure, the prevailing
understanding. Most scholars seem to take it for granted that the enjoyment of
citizenship rights requires possession of citizenship status. This is made clear in many
contemporary discussions of the revival of the constitutional concept of citizenship as
a basis for rights. Scholars most often read the Privileges or Immunities Clause, for
example, as ensuring citizenship rights only for people who possess citizenship status.
As Michael Kent Curtis has written, "the rights possessed by virtue of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are held by those with the status
of citizens of the United States." 101 This is, he says, "a simple and direct reading" of
the textual language.' 0 2 Likewise, Akhil Amar specifically rejects Ely's bifurcated
nationality in fact and in law, see generally Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of
Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411 (1997).
99 See ELY, supra note 19.
100 One way of expressing this divide in textual terms might be to say that while aliens are
clearly not "Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citizen[s]," Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815,827
(1971), they are in many respects, Fourteenth-Amendment-second-sentence citizens.
101 Michael Kent Curtis, HistoricalLinguistics, Inkblots, and LifeAfterDeath: The Privileges
or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1071, 1149 (2000). On interpreting
the closely analogous Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Justice O'Connor observed,
"[t]he word 'Citizens' suggests that the Clause also excludes aliens. Any prohibition of
discrimination aimed at aliens ... must derive from other constitutional provisions." Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 74 n.3 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
102 Michael Kent Curtis, Two Textual Adventures: Thoughts on Reading Jeffrey Rosen's
Paper, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1269, 1272 (1998).
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reading of the Clause, maintaining that the Clause is best read as "defining the rights
of Americans as Americans."103
The assumption that citizenship is the preserve of citizens has also been voiced
by some scholars who have criticized the citizenship revival in constitutional and
political discourse. Scholars have argued, on that basis, that a revitalization of
citizenship will almost certainly work to the detriment of aliens. In my own work, I
have warned of such a consequence, contending that, as a rhetorical and practical
matter, treating "citizenship" as the measure of full political and social inclusion may
implicitly work to exclude persons who lack citizenship by legal definition.' 04 Once
again, the operant assumption here is that the status and substance of citizenship
necessarily converge. If rights are conceived as a kind of citizenship, in this view,
then aliens will be unjustly disadvantaged.
On its face, the notion that citizenship is the exclusive preserve of citizens is
hardly a surprising proposition. Among other things, it seems natural to treat variants
of the same root word as closely related attributes. Common sense understandings
tend to regard the term "citizenship" as the state of being a citizen,10 5 and "citizen" as
the identity of one who enjoys citizenship. This reciprocal and mutually-referential
sort of definition is reflected in much of the theoretical scholarship about citizenship.
In political and legal theory, citizenship's subjects are often defined entirely
derivatively, by reference to their possession of substantive citizenship, and
citizenship's substance is likewise defined in relation to what the subjects of
citizenship possess or enjoy or do. Civic republicans, for example, approach
citizenship as a state of purposeful engagement in the life of the political community;
for them, active self-governance is citizenship's substance. And in this tradition, when
a person exercises or enjoys or enacts such citizenship, she becomes "a citizen" by
definition. Conversely, a citizen in the republican sense is understood to be a person
who is actively engaged in the process of the political community's process of self-
103 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BiLt OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 364 n.42
(1998). For a similarly skeptical discussion of Ely's reading, see also Michael I. Perry, Brown,
Boiling and Originalism: Why Ackerman and Posner (Among Others) Are Wrong, 20 S. iL. U.
L.J. 53, 61 n.44 (1995). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizenship Talk: A Revisionist
Narrative, 69 FORDHAM L. RV. 1689, 1694 n.32 (2001) (assuming that non-citizens cannot claim
the protection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Levin, supra note 43, at 586 ("The 1866
[Civil Rights] Act envisioned a different set of beneficiaries than the Amendment did. The
Amendment returned to the language of citizenship... [whereas] the civil rights enumerated in the
1866 Act inured to the 'inhabitants of every race."'); Karst, supra note 6, at 42 ("[T]he privileges
and immunities clause [sic] is addressed explicitly to the rights of citizens.").
104 Bosniak, supra note 17; Bosniak, supra note 21, at 29-36.
105 For example, THE AMERICAN HERrrAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGUSH LANGUAGE 245
(1969), defines "citizenship" as "the status of a citizen, with its attendant duties, rights and
privileges."
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government; and when a person is a citizen, she or he is, by definition, practicing
"citizenship."10
6
In the prevailing view then, a subject of citizenship is simply one who enjoys
citizenship in substantive terms, and substantive citizenship is simply what citizens
have or do. Substance and subjects are not independent attributes of citizenship; they
are merely different ways of expressing the same citizenship-related condition.
Yet as we have seen, this is not the only understanding scholars maintain of the
relationship between the subjects and the substance of citizenship. Indeed, in
American constitutional discourse, the relationship between these attributes of
citizenship is often regarded as distinctly fractured. The second-class citizenship
critique, first of all, specifically recognizes that the subjects and substance of
citizenship do not always converge; people not infrequently possess citizenship status
without enjoying much in the way of what we consider to be the substance of
citizenship.
The status of aliens presents another possibility of disjuncture between
citizenship's subjects and its substance. Immigration commentators have often noted
that today, lawful permanent resident aliens "live lives largely indistinguishable from
those of most U.S. citizens ... exercis[ing] most constitutional rights on the same
terms as native-born and naturalized citizens." 107 To the extent the exercise of such
rights is characterized as the enjoyment of "citizenship"--and describing rights in the
language of citizenship is increasingly common-we will face the prospect of what
we can only call "alien citizenship"-or more to the point, "noncitizen citizenship."
While apparently paradoxical, such neologisms make clear that the American
conception of constitutional citizenship is partially split, with the "who" and the
"what" of citizenship not always neatly lined up.
E. Is Citizenship for Aliens Unjust?
Most constitutional scholars today criticize this lack of alignment when it takes
the form of second-class citizenship. Most assume, in other words, that if a person
possesses the status of citizenship, she ought to fully possess the substance of
citizenship as well. As we have seen, this is a critically important staple of progressive
constitutional thought. To grant membership in formal terms while denying
protections and privileges enjoyed by other members is simply unjust exclusion. To
use the fact of a person's nominal membership as a smokescreen for their de facto
exclusion is rank hypocrisy. This seems clear.
106 As one theorist has written, "Within civil republicanism, citizenship is an activity or a
practice, and not simply a status, so that not to engage in the practice is, in important senses, not to
be a citizen." Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modem
World, in THE CrnZENSHIP DEBA'S: A READER 75, 79 (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998).
10 7 T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, BETWEEN PRINCIPLES AND POLmCS: THE DRECtION OFU.S.
CrrzENSHIP PoucY 46 (1998); see also Schuck, supra note 46.
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But does the converse argument hold as well? Is bifurcated citizenship in the
other direction-the enjoyment of citizenship rights without the possession of
citizenship status-likewise objectionable?
One response to this question would be that such a divide is indeed objectionable,
and that citizenship status should be a prerequisite for citizenship rights. The strongest
versions of this argument rely on a heavy dose of symbolic nationalism; they espouse
the claim that formal citizenship is an essential status for marking who belongs to "we
the people." In this perspective, citizenship status is significant precisely because it
separates members from outsiders. Anti-immigrant activists and commentators defend
views of this sort,108 but constitutional analysts have as well. Jeffrey Rosen, for
instance, has argued that the Supreme Court should "resurrect[ ] the distinction
between citizens and aliens ... [and thereby] resurrect the meaning of citizenship
itself as something more than a pale and disembodied legalism."' 10 9
Such views have also been expressed by more progressive scholars. William
Eskridge, for instance, has recently defended the "proposition that the 'privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States' are those entailing obligations as well as
rights that set apart the full membership in the political community from the outsider,
or alien." '" 0 This is not merely an interpretive statement about the meaning of the
privileges or immunities clause: it is an affirmative claim, as well, about the proper
relationship between citizenship rights and citizenship status-a claim that important
citizenship rights are properly confined to those possessing the status.
Despite the somewhat inflammatory phrasing, Eskridge's is not entirely an
outlying view. Many people assume that citizenship status "has to count for
something," '' ' that it must be consequential," 2 and they assume that its
consequentiality resides, in part, in assured and exclusive access to certain rights (and
responsibilities). Indeed, the notion that citizenship status ought to be a prerequisite
108 See, e.g., GEORGIE ANN GEYER, AMERICANS No MORE (1996).
109 Jeffrey Rosen, Exclusion, Discrimination and the Making of Americans: America In
Thick and Thin, NEW REPUBuC, Jan. 5 & 12, 1998, 29, 36 (reviewing ROGERS M. SMrrH, Civic
IDEALS: CONFLICnNG VIEWS OFCrnZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997)); see also Frederick Schauer,
Community, Citizenship, and the Search For National Identity, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1504, 1515
(1986) (arguing that citizenship status serves as the principal mechanism for social cohesion and
common identity in the United States, and arguing that citizenship status must therefore count for
something in order to serve this "community-bonding function"); Schuck, supra note 46.
110 William N. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 15, at 1726. Eskridge goes on to write that "the
Court's jurisprudence ought to read the Equal Protection Clause differently, in some respects, for
citizens than for noncitizens." Id at 1727.
111 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 114 (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("In this free
country... citizenship means something.").
112 William Rogers Brubaker, Introduction, in IMMIGRA'ION AND THE POLMCS OF
CrrIzENSHW IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 1, 4 (William Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989)
(citizenship in its ideal form will be "consequential," among other things, meaning that it "should
entail important privileges").
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for the enjoyment of at least some citizenship rights is presupposed by anyone who
supports continued denial to aliens of the right to vote--a commonly accepted feature
of even the most liberal and egalitarian democratic states today. 113 The citizen voting
rule represents a rather weak version of the principle that citizenship status should be
necessary for citizenship rights in that it confines itself to only one right rather than
many. Nevertheless, the principle is widely accepted in this context.
On the other hand, it is striking to note the degree to which the "citizenship for
citizens" principle does not much characterize the state of the law in this country, at
least beyond the franchise. As many scholars have noted, most aliens-including
undocumented aliens-are afforded a broad range of constitutional (as well as
statutory) rights which in some respects render them indistinguishable from
citizens.11 4 This is a function of our constitutional system's guarantee of rights to
"persons" rather than "citizens" in most cases-a state of affairs that has been
forcefully defended by many scholars over the years. Their basic argument is that
"personhood" embodies a powerful ideal of universality, one which represents a core
commitment of our constitutional system. "15
Precisely because of this universalist commitment, most of those who defend the
personhood model would not regard the extension of citizenship rights to those
without citizenship status as morally reprehensible; indeed, they regard it as entirely
necessary. From their perspective, the two sorts of citizenship misalignment discussed
here-rights without status and status without rights-cannot be regarded as moral
equivalents. As a supporter of personhood-based conceptions of rights, 116 1 believe
they are clearly right about this. So long as citizenship status is made available to
113 But see text accompanying notes 80-81 (discussing alien voting as an historical matter).
114 See also Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship (Update 1), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERJCAN
CONsTrrnmON 366, 366 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000) ("As a result of
a steady expansion of the Equal Protection and due process principles, legal resident aliens today
enjoy almost all the significant rights and obligations that citizens enjoy.").
115 It is this assumption that has rendered the post 9/11 establishment of military tribunals for
accused noncitizen terrorists highly controversial. By design, these tribunals provide an
adjudicative process stripped of important due process guarantees for the accused. These
procedures would, in ordinary circumstances, be deemed to violate basic precepts of constitutional
law, at least as to those aliens within the United States. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228, 238 (1896) (all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protections
guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). Times of declared national emergency are not
ordinary times, however, and few commentators expect that the courts will soon invalidate the
order establishing the tribunals.
116 See, e.g., Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership, supra note 14; Bosniak, Difference That
Alienage Makes, supra note 14; Linda S. Bosniak, Immigrants, Preemption, and Equality, 35 VA.
J. INT'LL. 179 (1994); Linda Bosniak, Opposing Proposition 187: Undocumented Immigrants and
the National Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REv. 555 (1986); Bosniak, supra note 17.
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noncitizens on fairly liberal terms, 117 granting what we often call "citizenship rights"
to status noncitizens is not a constitutional wrong, but instead gives appropriate
expression to the Constitution's universalist commitments.
II. UNIVERSAL C zENsHIP AND BOUNDED CmIzENSHP
But even if citizenship for aliens is not objectionable in the way that second-class
citizenship is, there remains the question of whether the notion of "alien citizenship"
is coherent by its own terms. Can Ely, Bobbit, Karst, and the others persuasively
maintain that persons constitute the rightful subjects of most constitutional rights,
while at the same time characterizing the substance of those rights as a form of
citizenship? 1 8 How far can the claim of citizenship for aliens extend?
At one level, answering this question is a matter of constitutional interpretation.
Certainly, the scholars I have focused on see themselves as making interpretive
arguments about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment; they are interested
precisely in how that amendment accommodates (or fails to accommodate) the
mandates of personhood rights and citizenship. Should the Constitution, after the
Fourteenth Amendment's passage, be read as "now identitlying] personhood with
United States citizenship," 119 or did the Amendment intend a sharp divide between
them?
There are various aspects to the debate in the constitutional literature. Much of
the debate has taken the form of a dispute over the relationship between the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses (which speak of persons), on the one hand, and
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, on the other. Scholars have asked, among other
things: Are these clauses to be read as overlapping in meaning? 120 If so, is the
Privileges or Immunities Clause redundant? If not, what does its reference to "the
rights of citizens" add to the mix (read both in light of and in spite of
Slaughterhouse)? 121 Are the rights referred to narrower than the rights guaranteed to
117 The concern is that noncitizens not be locked permanently into alienage status. For an
important discussion of the injustice associated with permanent alienage, see MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
118 Others have formulated arguments structured in this way. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note
4, at 977 ("In his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, Harlan eloquently envisions a national polity of
free persons equally enjoying the fundamental rights of citizenship.").
119 Christopher L. Eisgruber, supra note 35, at 71.
120 Karst, supra note 6, at 15 (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment's framers "[made]
no serious effort to differentiate the functions of the various clauses" of Section 1).
121 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 43, at 609-11,614 (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is concerned with "the majoritarian, structural, and participatory rights of citizens," and
embodies commitments to "civil republicanism and participatory virtues," unlike the Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses which address "the substantive rights of personhood," namely, rights
to private autonomy).
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persons in the other clauses? 122 Much ink has been spilled on these and related
questions in the constitutional commentary, and scholars remain widely divided on
these issues.
But assessing the coherence of the idea of alien citizenship is a matter that
requires going beyond a parsing of constitutional history and text; it requires us to
consider, as well, questions of normative constitutional theory. As Karst has written,
citizenship--equal citizenship-is not merely a technical constitutional concept; it is
also "an ideal, a cluster of value premises."' 123 To evaluate the plausibility of the
concept of alien citizenship, therefore, we need to consider it in light of these
premises.
I have argued that any claim to the effect that aliens do and should enjoy aspects
of substantive citizenship effectively amounts to a claim that the constitutional
tradition which accords rights to persons is perfectly compatible with an
understanding of rights conceived as a form of citizenship. The question we are faced
with, therefore, is whether the claim is true: whether the constitutional commitments
of rights-to-persons and the constitutional conception of rights-as-citizenship are
indeed complementary. The answer, it seems to me, is that their compatibility only
goes so far. This is because rights-citizenship is usually conceived as embodying not
only universalist values, but nationalist values as well.
On first reading, the ideal of equal citizenship seems inextricably linked to an
ethic of rights based on personhood. As many commentators have argued, the
principle of equal citizenship embodies a commitment to universality. Kenneth Karst
writes that under this principle, "[e]very individual is... presumptively entitled to
treatment in our public life as a person ... deserv[ing of] respect."' 124 The ideal of
equal citizenship is grounded in a commitment to justice and recognition "for all." 125
It is this grand universalisn, which accords rights to persons by virtue of their
common humanity, that accounts for much of the concept's powerful political
resonance.
Yet upon further review, it becomes clear that "everyone" does not quite mean
everyone. For despite equal citizenship's professed commitment to universality, the
universality championed is, in fact, a circumscribed one. The constraints on
universality's scope are the result of the other core animating ideal of the equal
citizenship principle-that of community membership, or "belonging," in Karst's
122 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 41, at 240 ("All in all, it will not do to read the rights of
'persons' more broadly than those that were conferred on 'citizens."'). But see Earl M. Maltz, The
Constitution and Nonracial Discrimination: Alienage, Sex, and the Framers'Ideal of Equality, 7
CONST. COMMENT 251, 264, 271 (1990); Rosen, supra note 31, at 1245 ("There seems to have
been a general consensus that, whatever the Equal Protection Clause guaranteed, it was something
narrower than the Privileges or Immunities Clause.").
123 Karst, supra note 6, at 5.
124 Karst, supra note 74, at 248.
125 KARST, supra note 70, at 1.
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term. The notion of belonging is insistently inclusive within the community. Yet the
value of "belonging" also presupposes community boundaries-boundaries which
ultimately divide insiders from outsiders. 126 "By drawing a circle and designating
those within the circle as sovereign and equal," Alex Aleinikoff has written, "the
concept of citizenship perforce treats those outside the circle ... as less than full
members." 127
Most theorists of equal citizenship have tended to disregard citizenship's
exclusionary aspect in their work. Like many social and political theorists, they
"tend[ ] to take the existence of a bounded national 'society' for granted and to focus
on institutions and processes internal to that society."' 128 Their focus on citizenship
within the national community, in turn, allows them to treat citizenship as a
universalist ideal with an inherently expansive logic. Karst, for instance, writes of
equal citizenship's "expanding ... circle of belonging,"'129 though he has always
acknowledged that the process of inclusion remains incomplete. This expansive
conception of citizenship was expressed by political theorist Michael Walzer, who
similarly posits a citizenship that progressively incorporates outsider groups. He
writes: "Slaves, workers, new immigrants, Jews, Blacks, women-all of them move
into the circle of the protected, even if the protection they actually get is still unequal
or inadequate."130
This statement captures the predominant conception of citizenship among
mainstream constitutional scholars. Focusing on the nation's interior, they approach
citizenship-at least ideally-as a source of progressively inclusive and egalitarian
values. 13 1 It has thus fallen to those scholars specifically concerned with the
community's threshold to attend to citizenship's nationally-exclusionary
dimension. 132 Most often, it is the analysts concerned with immigration and with the
law's constraints on access to citizenship status who acknowledge and examine
citizenship's boundary-enforcing aspect. 133
126 Bosniak, supra note 17.
127 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizenship (Update 2), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONsTmirnON 368 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2000).
128 Brubaker, supra note 112, at 22; see also CHARLES R. BErrz, POLmCAL THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979).
129 KARST, supra note 70, at 3.
130 fichael Walzer, Citizenship, in POLmCALINNOVATION AND CONCEPTUALCHANGE 211,
217 (Terence Ball et al. eds., 1996).
131 This is true of most political and social theory concerned with citizenship as well. See
generally, Bosniak, supra note 17.
132 1 should note that it is not only constitutional scholars who tend to ignore citizenship's
threshold aspects. Immigration scholars, for the most part, also fail to engage with the kind of equal
citizenship discourse generated in mainstream constitutional theory.
133 Something of a division of labor has developed in the citizenship field, pursuant to which
threshold questions regarding both access to, and the significance of, formal national citizenship
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Yet while most scholars who champion the concept of equal citizenship tend to
ignore citizenship's exclusionary face, it is ultimately presupposed in their project.
First of all, as I have said, constitutional scholars often characterize equal citizenship
not merely as the universal enjoyment of rights but also as the experience of
community belonging or membership. Communities, of course, have insides and
outsides which are constituted by some sort of boundary, however permeable it may
be.
Furthermore, many constitutional theorists make their case on behalf of equal
citizenship by linking it to a particular form of community belonging which they
express through the concept of "national union" or "national unity."'1 34 Karst, for
instance, writes that "[tihe union of the American people is a constitutional value of
the first importance."1 35 And it is a value that is inextricably linked with the value of
equal citizenship; national unity is seen as a precondition for the practice of equal
citizenship, and equal citizenship, in turn, is viewed as a necessary condition for the
continued well-being of the community. 136 In Karst's view, "constitutional equality
can be seen as part of the social cement that holds our nation together,"' 37 while the
"interdependence of citizens that is the foundation for the national union" likewise
serves to "strengthen the material and moral foundations of equal citizenship."138 A
number of other constitutional scholars have similarly linked equal citizenship with a
normative conception of "national unity." 139
status are treated as distinct from questions about the nature and quality of citizenship as practiced
within the political community. I have written elsewhere: "'The former questions are usually
confined to the domain of immigration scholarship, while the latter are treated as political and
constitutional theory's core enterprise." Id. at 965.
134 In the Supreme Court's recent decision in Saenz-a case which has been regarded by
many commentators as breathing new life into the Privileges or Immunities Clause-the majority
opinion concludes with what F.H. Buckley calls "a paean to national unity." Buckley, supra note 3,
at 233. As Justice Stevens writes, "The Fourteenth Amendment, like the Constitution itself, was, as
Justice Cardozo put it, 'framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or
swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division."'
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 511 (1999) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,
523 (1935)).
135 Karst, supra note 16, at 549.
136 Id.
137 Karst, supra note 74, at 280.
138 Karst, supra note 16, at 571; see also KARST, supra note 70, at 2 ("Equality and belonging
are inseparably linked: to define the scope of the ideal of equality in America is to define the
boundaries of the national community.").
139 See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 3, at 223-24,232 (proposing a "nationalist account of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause" according to which "basic constitutional liberties are constitutive
of the American identity and deserve support as a symbol of American nationalism"); Mark
Tushnet, Thinking About the Constitution at the Cusp, 34 AKRON L. REv. 21, 34 (2000) ("In
important ways the Constitution, with its opening words 'We the People of the United States,' is a
document about national unity; a document that tries to create-at least through thetoric-a single
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None of these scholars appears to see any inherent tension between the normative
commitments associated with national unity and equal citizenship's universalist
commitments. On the contrary, they regard equal citizenship and national unity as
mutually necessary and mutually reinforcing parts of a whole. And they are surely
right that citizenship's dual commitments are often productively complementary
within the ambit of the nation. In particular, it seems indisputable that schisms
internal to the nation along class or caste or state lines have thwarted struggles for
universal and equal rights within the nation; and conversely, it is clear that a sense of
national identification and community solidarity has animated many efforts to give
content and effect to the equal citizenship principle in this country.
Yet while these constitutional scholars apparently regard the ideal of national
unity as an antidote to divisiveness and fragmentation internal to the nation, 140 I
would contend that the practice of ensuring the "belonging" and "unity" of the
nation's members simultaneously, and inevitably, signals the existence of a sharp
divide between insiders and outsiders to the nation. For one thing, the very rhetoric of
national unity rather unavoidably serves to conjure up the specter of foreign threat. In
general, political and scholarly discourse rallying to a position of "national unity" is
quite often meant to evoke a defensive posture in relation to a danger posed by non-
national outsiders-at least as often as (and in the recent period, far more than)-to
evoke a domestic campaign against internal fragmentation and divisiveness. 141
While I am quite certain that those scholars who link equal citizenship with the
ideal of national unity have no intention of conveying any such defensive and
nationalist message, the term's reverberations are hard to deny. And even if we
discount such paranoiac associations, the ideal of "national unity" remains essentially
a nationalist construct in ethical terms. Describing national unity as a foundation of
the equal citizenship principle at the very least conveys the message that we maintain
a special commitment to the well-being of members of our own national
community-that we feel a kinship with them and maintain moral obligations to them
above all others. 142 In this ethical nationalist formulation, we still presume a class of
people of the United States, notwithstanding our wide differences."); Eisgruber, supra note 5, at
1336 (describing "political unity" as a central constitutional principle); BLACK, supra note 5;
Eskridge, supra note 15.
140 This is made especially clear in KARST, supra note 70, at 177-81.
141 While the term can no doubt be used in both senses, its double meaning or double
connotation is inescapable, notwithstanding that its users in this context do not intend to deploy the
term this way. The claim I make here is that certain political phrases do certain kinds of rhetorical
work quite independent of the speaker's intention.
142 Mark Tushnet articulates an explicit version of this argument. In a recent book, he
endorses a vision of constitutional law in which people are committed to a national community
rather than a universal one. He urges that:
[T]he people of the United States continue to constitute ourselves by a commitment to
universal human rights. We are citizens of the United States-not citizens of the world at
large, or cosmopolitans indifferent to the place we happen to find ourselves in--because of
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foreigners whose existence defines a national "us," and although they are not
constructed as overfly dangerous, their experiences and interests are nevertheless
assumed to be of lesser significance to us than those of our compatriots.143
In sum, while constitutional scholars thus tend to avoid direct attention to
citizenship in its bounded aspect and focus on the community's interior, their
substantive accounts of equal citizenship within the nation often presuppose such
boundaries. Citizenship's universalism is, in this regard, a circumscribed
universalism, constrained by a concurrent commitment to ethical nationalism.
That the normative ideal of equal citizenship in constitutional thought is, in the
end, a nationally-bounded universalist project of course poses important questions at
the level of political theory-including questions about the moral justifiability of
preferring the interests of national insiders over national outsiders in a world
characterized by vastly unequal life chances. 144 While these are pressing matters, I am
concerned for the moment not so much with the legitimacy of nationalism per se as
with understanding the relationship between citizenship's nationalist and universalist
commitments in the first instance. How can citizenship be both universalist and
bounded simultaneously?
To the extent that the division between citizenship's dual commitments is
acknowledged by scholars at all, the usual assumption is that each applies to a
different jurisdictional sphere or domain. 145 It is presumed, as a rule, that citizenship's
nationalist commitments are relevant at the borders, facing outward, and that
citizenship's universalist commitments are relevant within the community, facing in.
that commitment .... Whatever the ultimate scope of the Declaration's principles, the people
of the United States do not yet have general responsibility for the well-being of people all
over the world. At least for the time being, we can limit the benefits of our welfare state to
those who are in some meaningful sense part of us.
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONsTrTmnON AWAY FROM THE COURTS 191, 193 (1999).
143 This is implicit in communitarian theory, and sometimes made explicit. See Oldfield,
supra note 106, at 81.
Citizenship is exclusive: it is not a person's humanity that one is responding to, it is the fact
that he or she is a fellow citizen, or a stranger. In choosing an identity for ourselves, we
recognize both who our fellow citizens are, and those who are not members of our
community, thus who are potential enemies.
Id.
144 See generally GLOBAL JUSTICE: NoMos XLI (Ian Shapiro & Lea Brilmayer eds., 1999).
145 Something resembling this common-sense model was articulated by Michael Walzer in
SPHERES OFJUSTICE. See WALZER, supra note 117. For discussion of Walzer's argument about the
proper reach of the membership sphere and implications for the treatment of aliens, see Bosniak,
Difference That Alienage Makes, supra note 14.
20021 1321
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
It is presumed, in other words, that while citizenship embodies a universalist ethic
within the community, it is exclusionary at the community's edges. 146
This Janus-like image of citizenship is often accurate-but not always. On the
one hand, citizenship's universalist commitments are sometimes brought to bear at
the nation's borders. Humanitarian admissions policies, and rules requiring due
process in deportation proceedings, are powerful examples. 147 On the other hand, and
more significant here, citizenship's exclusionary commitments are not always
confined to the state's territorial perimeter, but are sometimes brought to bear even
within the nation's territory. When this happens, principles of universal citizenship
and bounded citizenship occupy the same (internal) terrain. 148
The case of aliens makes this clear-and here we come full circle. On the one
hand, the equal citizenship principle regards aliens as entitled to equal regard and
recognition as persons residing in our community. Karst argues that "it is important to
extend most of the content of the equal citizenship principle to aliens... because for
most purposes [aliens] are members of our society."' 149 This is the universalist strand
of the equal citizenship principle at work, and it has been highly influential, for aliens
do enjoy many fundamental rights as members. At the same time, however, Karst also
suggests that aliens-even lawful permanent resident aliens-may be properly
regarded as outsiders to the nation's "political community" by virtue of the primary
allegiance they maintain to their home states. As a consequence, he maintains, they
may legitimately be denied political rights, including the right to vote. 150 The
principle of equal citizenship, in this context, permits and perhaps even requires, the
exclusion of outsiders from the political community-the same community in which
universal equal citizenship is practiced.
The condition of undocumented immigrants pointedly illustrates the dynamic.
The equal citizenship principle is usually understood to demand the extension of core
constitutional rights to the undocumented. The Supreme Court expressed the point
plainly: "Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or
transitory is entitled to [basic] constitutional protection."151 Yet many proponents of
equal citizenship also tolerate the exclusion of these immigrants-particularly the
culpable adults152 -from other core benefits of membership,153 and most seem to
14 6 See, e.g., ROGERS BRUBAKER, CIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY
21 (1992) ("Although citizenship is internally inclusive, it is externally exclusive.").
147 See generally Bosniak, Difference That Alienage Makes, supra note 14.
148 Id.
149 KARST, supra note 70, at 45.
150 Id. Karst's argument does not hold up given that we today consider dual citizens-who
likewise maintain allegiance to other state-as entitled to vote in this country.
151 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
152 I refer to the contrast drawn in Justice Brennan's opinion in Plyler v. Doe between
"innocent children," who deserve special protection, and their culpable parents who "elect to enter
1322 [Vol. 63:1285
CONSTITUTIONAL CITIZENSHIP
regard as acceptable, and perhaps even necessary, their subjection to deportation on
grounds of unlawful entry or presence. 154 Significantly, the threat or actuality of
deportation works to undercut equal citizenship not merely directly but also indirectly:
these immigrants are often unwilling to invoke the rights they are formally entitled to
for fear of coming to the attention of the immigration authorities. 155 The result, once
again, is that while equal citizenship requires rights for everyone, it also tolerates, and
perhaps even demands, the exclusion of certain territorially-present non-nationals-
with the effect that the inclusive force of the principle of equal citizenship is both
directly and indirectly compromised.
The ambiguous status of aliens under an equal citizenship regime makes clear
that the marriage of personhood with equal citizenship proposed by Karst and the
others is bound to be a partially unstable union. However compatible the idea of equal
citizenship is with rights for persons qua persons in most cases, the idea of citizenship
also presupposes a bounded national community. This is a community characterized
by exclusionary commitments-political and territorial commitments---that will
inevitably clash with a pure personhood rights approach. And it is precisely in the
context of aliens' rights where that tension is most likely to emerge.
For all of these reasons, the claim by Karst, Bobbit, Ely, and the others to the
effect that aliens can be the subjects of citizenship, and their suggestion that the
revitalization of the idea of constitutional citizenship need not, in principle, result in a
total diminution of rights for aliens, each seem quite plausible. There is, nevertheless,
an intrinsic limit to the citizenship that aliens can enjoy. Theirs is something of a
second-class citizenship-though this is not second-class citizenship in its classical
form, pursuant to which those afforded the formal status of citizenship are
nevertheless denied many of the rights of citizenship in law and in practice. This is,
instead, a second-class citizenship in which the individuals involved enjoy many of
the substantive rights of citizenship even in the absence of formal citizenship status;
and yet the scope of the rights they enjoy is, at the same time, constrained by virtue of
citizenship's other substantive commitments which include a commitment to national
exclusivity and closure.
our territory by stealth and in violation of our law," and who "should be prepared to bear the
consequences, including, but not limited to, deportation." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,220 (1982).
153 See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 46; SMrH, supra note 47; Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 54,96 & n. 110 (1997) (stating that
while the people subject to the U.S. government's sovereign power "deserve a fair share of the
benefits that result from the collective enterprise in which they participate," "[i]llegal aliens, who
have violated the laws of the collective enterprise, may forfeit any claim to share in the common
good").
154 Efforts to enact a new amnesty or legalization program, which in the early part of 2001
looked promising, were shelved after the terrorist attacks of September 11.
155 Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership, supra note 14, at 986-87.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Constitutional citizenship is a divided construct. It is divided conceptually-as
between status and rights--and it is divided normatively-through its embodiment of
both universalist and nationalist commitments. These divisions complicate the efforts
by scholars to revive constitutional citizenship as the basis for our individual rights
jurisprudence. At the very least, it requires those promoting the citizenship turn in
constitutional law to recognize citizenship's multiple dimensions, and to engage
directly with them in their work. As an important part of this process, we should hope
to see increasing intellectual incursions-in both directions-across the professional
divide that now separates scholars of rights-citizenship and status-citizenship. We
should also hope for more direct acknowledgment among equal citizenship advocates
of the usually unrecognized premises of normative nationalism embedded in their
project.
I do not, on the other hand, expect that increased engagement across citizenship's
various fracture lines will lead, in the end, to a more coherent and unitary theory of
constitutional citizenship. On the contrary, I suspect that it will simply put us in a
better position to understand constitutional citizenship's ultimate lack of unity and
coherence. In his sweeping historical work on American citizenship, political scientist
Rogers Smith describes what he calls "the huge iceberg of anomalies and
contradictions that lurk below the surface of American citizenship laws. 1 56 Smith's
description, it seems to me, aptly characterizes not merely our citizenship laws157 but
the concept of constitutional citizenship itself This is our condition, and following
Smith's example, we ought to come directly to terms with it.
I have argued elsewhere that citizenship, in general, is a concept whose meaning
is highly contested and multivalent. 158 In constitutional law, the meaning of
citizenship is only somewhat more certain. We know, more or less, what is meant
when we speak of citizenship as status, but beyond this lies much uncertainty. To
what extent is the Constitution concerned with the rights of citizenship and what,
precisely, would those rights be? How, as a textual matter, should we understand the
relationship between the citizenships designated in the first and second sentences of
the Fourteenth Amendment? What, in normative terms, ought citizenship to stand for
in both or either of the Amendment's citizenship-related clauses?
156 ROGERSM. SMTH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OFCIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
13 (1997). Smith goes on to write that "American citizenship... has always been an intellectually
puzzling, legally confused, and politically charged and contested status." Id. at 14.
157 By "citizenship laws," Smith means "the statutes and judicial rulings that have defined
what American citizenship [is] and who is eligible to possess it." Id. at 2.
158 Bosniak, supra note 2; see also JuDmi N. SHKLkR, AMERICAN CmZENSHIP: THE QUEST
FOR INCLUSION 1 (1991) ("There is no notion more central in politics than citizenship, [yet] none
more variable in history, or contested in theory.").
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I think it is fair to say that these are not questions that have fixed answers that will
subject themselves to a process of discovery. Rather, constitutional theorists of
citizenship are engaged in the process of answering them as we go. Citizenship is a
powerful term of political rhetoric which many seek to clain--though again, its
precise denotative meaning is highly contested. I personally support understandings of
citizenship that are inclusive and universalist, as against nationalist and particularist
conceptions. But the first step in any struggle over citizenship's future is to map its
present contours. And for such a project, the category of alienage is indispensable.

